This paper proposes an anomaly detection model based on the reconstruction error to detect malicious requests in a Web application. Our model combines a multi-head attention network and gated convolution network to capture the pattern of a normal request. Moreover, we use a novel segmentation method to enhance the structural representation of a request and embed a raw request into a feature matrix. The result of this experiment indicates that our model has good ability to distinguish between normal and abnormal requests.
I. INTRODUCTION
Web applications are an indispensable part of our lives, allowing users to interact with the server by sending requests. Attackers can exploit a server by constructing malicious requests. Methods to attack a Web application include SQL injection, cross-site scripting, remote file inclusion, etc [1] .
There are two methods to detect whether a user has sent an attack or not, namely misuse detection and anomaly detection [2] . Misuse detection distinguishes attack requests from normal requests based on the characteristics of known attack types. The most common method of misuse detection is to make a series of rules based on known attack requests and determine whether these rules appear in a new request. However, it is difficult to maintain and update a rule library containing all attack modes. Anomaly detection detects attack requests by determining whether the request deviates from the normal request patterns. Anomaly detection usually "familiarizes" normal requests by learning the character distribution and character transfer patterns of normal requests. Anomaly detection can still distinguish an attack from a normal request after the attack mode has been changed because the establishment of the anomaly detection model does not depend on attack requests. The results of many studies on anomaly detection technology have also been applied to attack detection in Web applications and these models often contain two steps. Firstly, the feature representations The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was S. K. Hafizul Islam . of requests are obtained, and then anomaly detection methods are applied to these feature representations. Methods to extract request features include n-gram [3] , bag-of-words [4] , character distribution model [5] , etc.; however, these methods have limitations in our task. The bag-of-words and character distribution models cannot reflect the character sequence pattern of request, and the n-gram model tends to oversize the vocabulary. In this paper, we use word embedding [6] to extract request features and convert the text-type request to a computable matrix.
A lot of research has been done on the anomaly detection model. [7] uses the kernel method and support vector machine for anomaly detection. [8] puts forward a theory that abnormal data is sparser than normal data in geometric location distribution and uses it to distinguish abnormal data from normal data. [9] summarizes a series of methods about anomaly detection, including probability distribution, transition probability or Bayesian method. However, none of these methods can deal with the data format of Web application requests with character sequences because they all need to extract features manually or have high computational complexity. Some anomaly detection models are also used for Web application attack detection. [5] detects Web application attacks by combining multiple models. Each model describes a feature of a normal request, such as query parameter length, character parameter distribution, and parameter character transition mode. Each model calculates the probability of the corresponding feature in the request, which reflects the probability that the corresponding feature is abnormal. All anomaly scores are weighted sums in the final anomaly score. If the score of one or more models is greater than a given threshold, then the request will be determined as an attack request. However, the model relies on the features being extracted manually so that it can only detect specific attack types. [10] proposes a method of anomaly detection using deep learning. The method is divided into two stages. In the first stage, Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) is used to predict the probability distribution of the next character. In the second stage, a classification model based on multi-layer perception (MLP) is used to classify the probability distribution to determine whether the request contains attacks or not. This model uses convolutional neural network to extract request features automatically and does not need to extract features manually. However, the model still needs attack requests in the training stage, which restricts model to a specified attack type.
In addition, anomaly detection based on the reconstruction error has been studied extensively. Fig. 1 presents the overall architecture of anomalous request detection based on the reconstruction error. Anomaly detection based on reconstruction error usually includes two stages of training and detection. In the training stage, the reconstruction model attempts to reconstruct the normal requests with minimum error, which enables this model to reconstruct normal samples with small errors. Because attack requests are often quite different from normal requests, this model will generate a large error when reconstructing the attack requests. In the detection stage, the reconstruction error will be computed and regarded as the anomaly score of the request. The higher the exception score, the greater the possibility that the request is an attack request.
[11] proposes a method using Regularized Deep Autoencoder (RDA) as the reconstruction model. However, this model architecture is not aimed at the data format of Web application request. To solve this problem, we propose a reconstruction model that combines a multi-head attention network with a gated convolution network. Our model takes Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) of GET request method extracted from Web server logs as the input. After URLs are tokenized by some special characters, we use multi-head attention network and gated convolutional network to reconstruct the input URLs with minimum error. The reconstruction error will then be calculated based on the reconstructed URL to determine whether the URL is an attack URL or not. Our model is based on the idea of anomaly detection with reconstruction errors; that is, only normal requests are used to construct the model so it is not restricted by the type of attack. Our reconstruction model combines multihead attention network and gated convolution network, which have a stronger ability to learn sequence transfer patterns than RDA used in [11] . Besides, we use an improved word embedding method to extract request features, thus avoiding manual extraction. The experimental results demonstrate our model can detect Web application requests of various types of attacks and greatly improve the performance of RDA.
We make three contributions in this paper:
• We propose a reconstruction model that combines a multi-head attention network and gated convolution network for anomaly detection to detect attack requests.
• We propose a novel embedding method to enhance the structural representation of Web application data based on word embedding.
• We compare the ability of our model with RDA in detecting different types of Web application attacks and analyze why our model has a higher performance.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we introduce the structure of our model in detail. In Section III, we introduce each part of our model in a detailed way. In Section IV, we discuss the experiment details and results of our model and compare the performance of our model with RDA. The final section summarizes and concludes the paper.
II. ARCHITECTURE
Our model is based on gated convolutional network language modeling [12] . Inputs X = [x 1 , . . . x N ] of the model will be encoded into the context vector T = [t 1 , . . . , t N ] using the gated convolutional network. Then, the probability of the next word y i will be calculated based on the context vector as (1) and (2) .
where w m and b m are parameters to transform T into the dimension we need. In our task, y i is the reconstruction output of x i . Based on this probability, we can calculate the reconstruction error and use this error to determine if the request is an attack request. For our model, one of the main tasks is to learn the dependencies between sequences, that is, which input sequence models the output depends on. However, as the length of input sequence increases, more layers of gated convolution network need to be stacked. To enhance the ability of our model to capture request sequence long-distance dependence, we add the multi-head attention network before the gated convolutional network. Fig. 2 gives an overview of the reconstruction model proposed in this paper. The model is divided into four parts including structure-level embedding, multi-head attention network, gated convolution network and linear network.
Structure-level embedding converts the raw input sequence into structural component sequence and embeds each component into a multi-dimensional vector space, which encodes the raw input sequence as a feature matrix.
Using the feature matrix, a multi-head attention network learns the dependence between different structural components, which enables each component to obtain information from the others. Finally, the output of the gated convolution network is linearly mapped and the probability distribution of the output components predicted by a softmax function. Once the prediction is made, the reconstruction error is calculated to evaluate whether the request is an attack.
III. MODEL DETAILS A. EXTRACT DATA
In this paper, we extract request records from Web server logs for training and testing our model. A request record usually includes the request method, request time, request URL, and so on. Attackers often exploit a server by constructing malicious URLs, so we extract the request method from the log of GET request method. A URL always conforms to the following syntax [13] :
where part of the path is used to locate the resource and an optional query string is used to pass parameters to the resource, which consists of pairs of keys and values (also called ''attributes''). There are two common techniques used by attackers to construct an attack. For example, the attacker can construct a special path to read private files on the server or construct special parameters to read the contents of the database on the server. Therefore, we discarded parts of the protocol type, host and port so attackers could not use it to construct the attack request; we only kept parts of the path, query, and fragment to build our dataset. To build our dataset, all URLs are decoded and all uppercase characters converted to lowercase. Then, all of these URLs are converted to a feature matrix using structure-level embedding (this will be discussed in the next section).
B. STRUCTURE-LEVEL EMBEDDING
An important task is to convert text-type URLs into computable vectors or matrices. A common approach is to divide the URL into several characters according to certain rules and then use different vectors to represent each character. At present, there are two segmentation methods including word-level and character-level [3] . However, these two methods cannot be applied to our task. URLs contain a large number of query parameters, so word-level segmentation will produce a huge vocabulary. More importantly, these two segmentation methods make the model learn information independent of our task; for example, in URLs, many sub-character sequences are meaningless, such as timestamps or the result of a hash function. Learning the transfer patterns of these characters will not improve the performance of the model and may even cause over-fitting. Therefore, we propose the Structure-Level Segmentation (SLS) method and combine it with word embedding to encode the URL to a feature matrix. The whole process is divided into two steps. First, all the special characters in the URL (i.e., special characters such as ''−,'' ''/,'' etc.) are searched as segmentation characters to segment the URL into many character sequences. Then, these character sequences are mapped to different components that together with the segmentation characters form the structural representation of the URL. The mapping process can be described as follows:
Let p = [< r 1 , t 1 >, < r 2 , t 2 >, · · · , < r k , t k >] be a rule-component pair set. Character sequence s will be mapped into component t i if match(r i , s) = 1. For any character sequence s except the segmentation character, the rule set r = [r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r k ] needs to satisfy the following conditions:
The rule-component pairs proposed in this paper are described in Table 1 .
The advantage of this segmentation method is that it blurs the specific character composition of URLs, strengthens the structure information of URLs, and improves the model's generalizability. In addition, mapping substrings to a component shortens the length of data to be processed, reduces the vocabulary size, and improves the training and detection efficiency of our model. Figure 3 , the structural components sequence is transformed into the feature matrix using word embedding [6] . Word embedding uses a lower-dimensional, denser vector to represent each structural component. There are two common models of word embedding, namely the Continuous Bag-of-Words model (CBOW) and Continuous Skip-gram model. CBOW will be used in our task, which builds a pre-training network and tries to maximize the classification of a component based on another component in the same sequence to find the lookup table (the detail of CBOW can be found in [6] ). Afterwards, the URL is split and translated into structural component sequence c = [c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c K ] in which K is the number of components. Each component c i is represented by a one-hot vector ω i . All one-hot vectors can be combined as the onehot representation matrix ∈ R K ×N . The feature matrix is obtained by multiplying the lookup table by .
As shown in
E ∈ R N ×D is the lookup table produced by CBOW. N is the size of structural components and D is the dimension of the embedding vector. U = [u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u K ] is the feature matrix in which u i ∈ R D is the embedding vector for component c i .
C. MULTI-HEAD ATTENTION
The feature matrix of the URL is handled by the multi-head attention network [15] . Fig. 4 gives the calculation flow of the multi-head attention network, which can be formulated by (5) and (6) . where ∈ R K ×D is the output of the multi-head attention network and
∈ R hd k ×D are used to project feature matrix U into different subspaces with dimension d k , which enables our model to attend to information from different representation subspaces and also reduces data dimensionality; hence, the computational complexity h represents the times of projection.
is used to connect the matrices by column. The multi-head attention network makes each component contain information from the others, thereby helping capture the longdistance dependence of the component sequence.
D. GATED CONVOLUTION
The multi-head attention network cannot utilize the order information of structural components, but it is indispensable for our task. Therefore, we add a gated convolution net to take advantage of the component sequence. The process of gated convolution can be described as (7) . + c) . (7) where T ∈ R K ×D is the output after gated convolution and ⊗ is the element-wise product. V and Z are D convolution kernels with the same size of s × D but different weights. s denotes the number of components of each convolution kernel coverage. b and c describe the bias vector. The illustration of gated convolution network can be found in fig. 5 . We will pad the input to ensure that the dimension of output T is the same as the input dimension so we can stack several gated convolution layers to extract deep features. The gate structure in the network can be regarded as a non-linear function in the gated convolution net. A gated structure can effectively prevent gradient dispersion and control the path of information flow when multiple convolution layers are stacked. Gated convolution allows our model to select which component or features are relevant for predicting the next component.
E. ANOMALY SCORE
After linear transformation of T , the output of our reconstruction model is obtained through a softmax function, which is the probability distribution of the prediction component.
where W m ∈ R D×N and b m ∈ R N are projection parameters used to transform context matrix T to the same dimension as input .ˆ ∈ R K ×D is the reconstruction of . Then, the reconstruction error is calculated. The process is shown in Fig. 6 . The cross-entropy function is used to calculate the reconstruction error between the outputˆ and the input , which will be regarded as the anomaly score.
where ω j i is the j th element in ω i . The anomaly score represents the degree of anomaly of a URL and the higher the anomaly score, the more likely the URL is to be an attack sample.
IV. EXPERIMENT
Our model is trained and tested on a real-world dataset extracted from Web server logs. The data are divided into training set and test set. The training set contains only normal request samples while the test set contains normal URLs samples and several different types of attack request samples as mentioned in [1] . There are 300,000 normal URLs in our training set and details of the different types of attacks in the test set are described in Table 2 .
A. TRAINING DETAILS
We implement our model with TensorFlow [16] and accelerate our training with Nvidia GTX1060 GPU. We use Adam [17] optimizer in TensorFlow with default parameters to minimize reconstruction error at training stage. In our experimental model, we set h = 6 for the multi-head attention network and stack three gated convolution layers. We set the word embedding dimension to be 100. For the dataset, we set the maximum length of component sequence to K = 200. Numbers of components in a sequence exceeding 200 will be discarded and if less than 200 and zeros vectors with dimension 100 will be padded. We train our model over 10 epochs with batch sizes of 200 and save the last model for the detection stage. Fig. 7 presents the loss curve at the training stage. It can be seen from the figure that our model can reconstruct the input with minimal error. However, the ability to reconstruct input well does not indicate that our model has good performance. If the normal input and attack input of the model are reconstructed with small errors, then the model cannot distinguish the normal and attack input very well. Therefore, we use Precision, Recall, F1-score, Area under Curve (ROC), and Area under an ROC (AUC) to evaluate the performance of our model. Table 3 compares performance between RDA and our model with different evaluation indices, and Fig. 8 plots the details of the ROC curve. Our model has a great ability to distinguish between normal and attack requests; however, RDA is less effective in our tasks. In addition, the result proves that applying the SLS to RDA can improve its performance. However, RDA still achieves a lower score in precision. The reason is that RDA learns only the character distribution of the request and not the transfer pattern; therefore, some attack requests with the same character distribution as normal requests are determined as normal by RDA. Our model not only learns the character distribution, but also the transfer pattern of the request; thus, we achieve a high score in precision and recall. Table 4 gives the details of AUC for different types of attack detection tasks. Our model achieves great results in detecting different types of attacks-even the worst is 0.9896. Applying the SLS to RDA can improve performance on remote code execution, remote command execution, and SQL Injection but still have poor performance on Local File Include (0.90) and Cross-Site Scripting (0.92).
B. RESULTS
We analyze the reconstruction error for different structural components of the attack sample. Fig. 9 shows the reconstruction errors of different parts of an attack sample in which the third line gives the error of different components. To display the error more intuitively, we use a deeper color to mark the larger reconstruction error. The result shows that our model can reconstruct the normal part with a lower error but reconstructs the attack query parameter with a larger error (higher reconstruction errors are marked by background colors with a higher color level). Special symbols have higher scores, which is in line with our common sense because symbols often play an important role in attacks. Using this feature, normal samples and attack samples can be distinguished well using our model.
V. CONCLUSION
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